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THE SPECIAL NEEDS RATIONALE: CREATING A
CHASM IN FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Kenneth Nuger
I. INTRODUCTION
In a society that cherishes both individual liberty and con-
stitutional government, -it may seem inevitable that increased
societal complexity would complicate government's ability to
resolve conflict deemed harmful to the public interest. On the
one hand, individuals demand their rights not be arbitrarily
restricted by government action. On the other hand, citizens
also demand that government protect them from the harmful
effects from other citizens' behavior. The resulting tension
creates serious obstacles for legitimate governmental action.
Government must simultaneously ensure individual freedom,
yet prevent behavior judged inimical to the public interest. Yet
if government efforts to restrain behavior contradict constitu-
tional standards, public perceptions of governmental legitimacy
may erode. If this happens, government's ability to assure its
citizenry that collective action will not harm the public interest
could be seriously jeopardized.
This article analyzes the Supreme Court's formulation of
the special needs rationale and its recent lower court applica-
tion. The paper posits that the special needs rationale misplac-
es Fourth Amendment intent by placing an inordinate empha-
sis on governmental objectives and undervaluing Fourth
Amendment privacy protections. Rather than assessing if a
search meets probable cause requirements, the special needs
rationale only requires a court to assess whether the search was
reasonable in light of the perceived importance of the particu-
lar public policy. Without specific, objective parameters guid-
ing administrative search schemes, this type of balancing test
leaves absolute discretion to individuals implementing a search
and effectively frees them from Fourth Amendment procedur-
al requirements. When the Supreme Court argues that an
otherwise unconstitutional search is saved because the special
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needs of government justify privacy invasions against targeted
citizens, the Court adopts a Fourth Amendment analytical -tool
fraught with fatal flaws. The special needs rationale lacks any
objective methodology, devalues fundamental Fourth Amend-
ment individual privacy rights, and undermines legal stability
by requiring ad hoc analysis of the reasonableness of a govern-
mental search.' This article argues that unless the Supreme
Court realigns its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to parallel
the historical intent of the Fourth Amendment, citizens'
Fourth Amendment privacy protections will be subject to me-
thodical erosion.
II. THE SPECIAL NEEDS RATIONALE IN A FOURTH AMENDMENT
CONTEXT
Without constitutional principles to guard against abusive
public policy, citizens could be victimized by policy developed
from unprincipled, overzealous government discretion. The
delegates at the Constitutional Convention, acutely sensitive to
the tyrannical abuses of the English Crown, devised a constitu-
tional scheme intended to place strong checks against unre-
strained governmental action. The Bill of Rights were soon
added, further defining the scope of citizens' liberty and more
clearly limiting government invasions that might threaten indi-
vidual liberty. As part of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amend-
ment was intended to safeguard citizens against unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.2
1. See Strossen, infra note 5, at 1184-87. The balancing test utilized in the
special needs rationale is inherent in all Fourth Amendment balancing tests. The
unique aspect of the special needs rationale, however, is that it further reduces
the need for suspicion of wrongdoing by overemphasizing government objectives
and government's need to efficiently carry out the stated objectives.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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However, the amendment's clauses are subject to vigorous
scholarly and judicial debate. Both the "reasonableness clause"
and the "warrant clause" cloud Fourth Amendment analysis
with uncertainty. Issues concerned with defining reasonable-
ness and deciding whether any search, if found reasonable,
must first require probable cause,' have been subject to in-
tense judicial analysis. Historically, Fourth Amendment analysis
accepted the notion that any search or seizure was presumed
unreasonable unless it was based on a warrant and predicated
on probable cause.4 A few'scholars have even posited that
each clause may place independent conditions requiring
searches to be predicated on both probable cause, a warrant
and reasonableness.5
While a few carefully defined warrant exceptions have
evolved,6 the warrant requirement has been the rule in Fourth
Amendment analysis. In addition, the Fourth Amendment
does not distinguish criminal from noncriminal searches and
3. Probable cause, while not precisely defined, is guided by the requirements
necessary for an impartial magistrate to issue a search warrant. Government oath
or affirmation suggests government agents must have evidence attesting to the
integrity of the clause, "describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." Id.
4. Case law and scholarship support the conventional interpretation. See
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (the Court
iterated, "reasonableness turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of
the warrant clause"). See also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 282 (1984), (stating that "fourth amend-
ment reasonableness turns on the presence of the essential precondition for a
valid warrant, probable cause . . . [which] has come to be regarded as the conven-
tional interpretation of the fourth amendment").
5. Nadine Strossen, The Fouith Amendment in the Balance: Accutately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intiusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1180
(1988). Under this approach, each clause must not only meet probable cause and
warrant standards, but also be reasonable. However, this approach has received
little support. While Professor Strossen believes these requirements would more
closely safeguard citizens Fourth Amendment rights, they have not commanded
serious discussion by the Supreme Court. See id. at 1180 n.24.
6. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exigent circumstances);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to an arrest);
Schneckloth v. Bustanionte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search); United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (entire car and all objects inside capable of contain-
ing sought evidence); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (hot pursuit); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 1237
(1983) (totality of the circumstances); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (plain
sight) and United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (brief detentions where
crime was committed in presence of an officer).
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seizures, presumably requiring equal application in both con-
texts. However, courts often require more demanding stan-
dards in criminal applications. Noncriminal, administrative
intrusions have generally been paid greater deference because
they are primarily intended to assure compliance with regulato-
ry schemes, not to apprehend and criminally punish offenders.
Yet Frank v. Maryland7 suggests that noncriminal investigations
relate only peripherally to the Fourth Amendment.8 As a re-
sult of the criminal/noncriminal distinction, the reasonable-
ness clause has evolved a dichotomous definition. In Camara v.
Municipal Court,9 Justice White asserted that public health and
safety justify relaxed standards of reasonableness. Unlike crimi-
nal searches, administrative searches are intended to prevent
conditions inimical to the public interest. Therefore, when de-
termining if administrative inspections are reasonable, the
inspection must be considered in light of reasonable public
policy.' ° While Camara still technically requires probable
cause, probable cause will be met when there is reason to be-
lieve the objects of a search will be uncovered in the particular
dwelling. 1
Since Camara, courts have held administrative searches to
relaxed standards of reasonableness. 2 However, deference to
public policy maximizing the public interest has accelerated in
the 1980s and has all but eroded the significance of individual
privacy in the balancing equation. The Supreme Court has
demonstrated that when it believes government activity is par-
ticularly important, it will find a way to sidestep traditional
Fourth Amendment standards and accept search and inspec-
tion methods that transcend traditional law enforcement limi-
7. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
8. The Court suggested that any resulting privacy intrusions from adminis-
trative searches would "cause only the slightest restriction on [one's] claims of
privacy." Id. at 367.
9. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
10. Id. at 534-35.
11. In Camara, the goal of the search was city-wide compliance with minimum
private property standards. The Court in Camara believed the search was reason-
able, thereby meeting probable cause requirements, because it furthered the
reasonable goals of code enforcement. Id. at 535.
12. The Supreme Court .has upheld warrant exceptions when the search or
inspection is (1) authorized by statute, (2) consistent with legislative goals, and (3)
based on a general administrative plan necessary to enforce legislation. See Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
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tations. This is the basis of the special needs rationale. The
special needs rationale suggests that government, to maintain
the efficient and effective execution of vital government policy,
may engage in extraordinary search and inspection schemes
that would be unconstitutional if scrutinized from traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis.
III. SETTING THE STAGE FOR SPECIAL NEEDS: BALANCING
INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
The traditional view of the Fourth Amendment posits that
citizens have exceptional claims against arbitrary and capri-
cious government intrusions into their private lives.'" As the
Supreme Court reasoned in Boyd v. United States, 4 searches
should not be declared unreasonable because the government
breaks down a person's door and rummages through his draw-
ers, but rather because the search is an invasion of his indis-
pensable right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property. 5
Boyd suggests that Fourth Amendment protections are
geared toward maximizing the personal rights of individuals
against arbitrary government intrusions. Katz v. United States
supported this view.' 6 The Supreme Court in Katz confronted
whether a warrantless electronic surveillance of Katz's tele-
phone conversations in a public telephone booth violated the
Fourth Amendment. Although Katz conducted the conversa-
tion in public, the Supreme Court concluded that government
needed to obtain a warrant before it intruded on conduct in-
dividuals sought to keep private.
Recognizing that "the fourth amendment protects people,
not places,"' 7 the Supreme Court noted the evolution of a
13. The Supreme Court's standard of creating carefully drawn exceptions to
the warrant requirement supports this view. See supra note 6.
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. The Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), argued that any
forcible extortion of a man's testimony to be used as evidence to convict him of
a crime or to forfeit his goods, would violate the command of the Fourth Amend-
ment. If one's goods includes one's livelihood, then by reading Katz and Boyd
together, one could suggest that any administrative searches conducted without
probable cause and resulting in the loss of one's job or benefits would violate the
Fourth Amendment. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 n.16.
16. 389 U.S 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 351.
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two pronged test to determine whether a search met Fourth
Amendment requirements. If a person could demonstrate a
subjective expectation of privacy" and if the expectation of
privacy is one society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable,' 9 an individual could invoke full Fourth Amendment
protection. Significantly different from its current special
needs perspective, the Supreme Court in Katz considered the
activity in question irrelevant in its determination of the rea-
sonableness of the search.
While shortlived, Katz placed a preeminent value on the
privacy of the individual. When citizens' conduct suggests a
desire for privacy, government must first obtain a search war-
rant premised on probable cause. Katz was a reminder that the
Fourth Amendment's purpose was to protect individual priva-
cy, even at the expense of governmental efficiency."0
A year later, in Terry v. Ohio,"' the Supreme Court re-
treated from the individual privacy perspective and adopted a
balancing approach for criminally-oriented Fourth Amendment
analysis. In Terry, the Court considered whether an officer had
the right to "stop and frisk" a suspect for weapons without a
warrant unless probable cause would support an arrest.22 The
state argued that a stop-and-frisk was far less intrusive than an
arrest and was an indispensable tool for police to investigate
suspicious behavior. Police argued that to effectively guard the
public interest, it must be allowed to pursue "flexible re-
sponses graduated in relation to the amount of information
they possess."2" Therefore, they argued that limited pat
downs for weapons would be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when citizen activity looked suspicious. 4
18. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. The logic in Katz is fundamentally at odds with current special needs
analysis. Katz condemns a Fourth Amendment methodology that lacks any objec-
tive predetermination of probable cause and in its place substitutes a far less
reliable procedure that justifies probable cause on the search's potential impact on
a policy goal. Id. at 358 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id. at 10.
24. The police argued that the justification for a stop. and-frisk rests with the
officer's assessment of whether the situation posed any potential harm to the
officer, not whether there was reason to believe a crime had been committed. Ac-
cepting this logic, the Court relied on People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d. 32, 34-35
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Sensitive to both individual and police interests, the Su-
preme Court in Terry developed balancing criteria intended to
appease both interests. The balancing test, while still recogniz-
ing an individual's expectation of privacy, would balance the
strength of an individual's privacy right against the strength of
recognized government interests when the two interests
clashed.2" Since Terry, the Supreme Court has used this bal-
ancing approach in a manner that increasingly undervalues
individual privacy claims and defers to government policies
intended to expeditiously and efficiently accomplish stated
governmental objectives. While Terry's brief investigative deten-
tion first justified the balancing approach in the criminal con-
text, the Supreme Court had already articulated this balancing
approach to noncriminal searches in Camara v. Municipal
Court.2" In Camara, the Supreme Court validated routine
building inspections lacking in probable cause to enforce
health and safety codes. The Court recognized the inspec-
tions lacked traditional probable cause. Nevertheless, the
searches met the reasonableness test because in the absence of
any alternative code enforcement methods," these in-
spections constituted the only effective way to further the city's
health and safety codes.
29
Terry and Camara have reduced both the perceived impor-
tance of individual privacy and the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protection against government intrusions. This trend
developed because, when an individual's suspected harmful
conduct is balanced against societal interests, individual privacy
losses will appear negligible in relation to government's efforts
to protect society. However, this balancing approach is improp-
erly skewed toward the government's interest. When examined
(N.Y. 1964), ceil. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965), which accepted an officer's right to
touch a suspect being questioned.
25. 392 U.S. at 9.
26. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
27. Id. at 538-39.
28. The Court rejected the view of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959),
that the Fourth Amendment was only peripherally related to administrative search-
es anti instead accepted the probable cause standard. However, consistent with
Frank, it recognized probable cause would be more easily met if the state could
argue that the search would promote code enforcement goals. Camara, 387 U.S. at
530-31.
29. Id. at 537.
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from the public's perspective, governmental intrusions on indi-
vidual privacy will always seem slight when balanced against
the potential harm society is spared as a result of the intrusion.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte3s illustrates this problem. In
this case, the Supreme Court justified warrantless, suspicionless
stops and inspections of all vehicles and passengers at border
patrol checkpoints because each detention was at most, a limit-
ed and therefore acceptable Fourth Amendment intrusion."
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had argued that
because nearly 150,000 stops would be made each week at just
one checkpoint, the cumulative effect of these brief stops con-
stituted an intolerable interference of the rights of innocent
persons.s2
Less direct but equally significant implications arise from
Fourth Amendment balancing. Some commentators argue that
massive warrantless searches breed societal discontent that can
undermine respect for the legal system." In addition, while
warrantless searches and seizures may make for more efficient
enforcement of government objectives, increasingly intrusive
searches can undermine perceptions of public security, a trend
contrary to the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 4 While
government has a responsibility to detect and deter illegal
activity, unreasonable governmental searches and seizures must
be viewed every bit as illegal as individual illegal activity. It is
counterintuitive for government to justify its own unreasonable
and therefore illegal behavior by balancing in favor of its need
to detect and deter illegal activity.35
30. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
31. d. at 54647.
32. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 322 (9th Cir. 1975). The
appellate court noted that 999 out of 1000 cars carried persons who were lawfully
entitled to use the public highways and had a right of free passage. The appellate
court believed it was absurd to allow the cumulative intrusion of stopping ten mil-
lion cars to find one person in a thousand violating United States law.
33. See Strossen, suprn note 5, at 1198.
34. See Strossen, supra note 5, at 1199.
35. Both the Framers of the Constitution and the Supreme Court have
recognized that the Fourth Amendment may result in less efficient government. In
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), Justice Jackson, in his dissenting
opinion, stated that our "forefathers thought [fewer arrests and convictions] was
not too great a price to pay for the decent privacy of home, papers and effects
which is indispensable to individual dignity and self respect." Similarly, in Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), Justice Marshall warned:
[Vol. 32
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Ultimately, the balancing approach that evolved from Terry
and Camara has allowed the Supreme Court to manipulate
Fourth Amendment analysis to protect virtually any inspection
scheme intended to preserve government's perception of pub-
lic interest.3 6 Perhaps this trend is exacerbated because of the
Fourth Amendment's failure to distinguish between criminal
and noncriminal searches.3 7 This shortcoming could justify
the position that Fourth Amendment protection should apply
equally in both the criminal and noncriminal context. Recog-
nizing that government programs are intended to foster the
public interest, one could also argue that administrative inspec-
tion schemes should enjoy more relaxed standards of reason-
ableness than criminally-oriented searches. This rationale is the
conceptual framework justifying special needs balancing. How-
ever, individual privacy interests will usually seem overshad-
owed by the public interest. Moreover, government, through
its judiciary, engages in the balancing test. Therefore, the re-
sulting balance may too easily reflect a pro government bias,
causing a steady erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.
This inequity has occurred in the special needs cases decided
in the 1980s.
IV. THE DEATH KNELL OF BALANCING AND THE EMERGENCE
OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS RATIONALE
The most troubling aspect of special needs analysis is the
Supreme Court's overzealous protection of government's es-
poused interests. Since noncriminal penalties are assessed
against citizens detected in administrative searches, and since
these searches are primarily intended to advance government
But constitutional rights have their consequences, and one is that ef-
forts to maximize the public welfare, no matter how well intentioned,
must always be pursued within constitutional boundaries. Were the
police freed from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment for just
one day to seek out evidence of criminal wrongdoing, the resulting
convictions and incarcerations would probably prevent thousands of
fatalities. Our refusal to tolerate this specter reflects our shared belief
that even beneficent governmental power-whether exercised to save
money, save lives, or make trains run on time-must always yield to
"a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards."
Id. at 650.
36. See inf a text. accompanying notes 38-153.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
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policy rather than to criminally punish, the Supreme Court has
had little difficulty embracing the constitutionality of adminis-
trative searches premised on decreasing levels of suspicion.
Although the Supreme Court has grappled with appropri-
ate suspicion levels needed to accept an administrative search
scheme, it has virtually ignored any analysis of the types of
government interests that could justify searches with relaxed
probable cause requirements. Lacking an objective framework
defining a special need combined with accepting searches pre-
mised on decreasing levels of suspicion, the Supreme Court
has steadily expanded the special needs rationale. The Court
has gone so far as to use the concept in National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab8  to rule that a massive,
suspicionless search, intended to deter activity that government
admitted had not yet happened nor would not likely happen in
the future did not violate the suspected individuals' Fourth
Amendment rights."9
A. Special Needs Justified to Further Vital Government Services
Von Raab notwithstanding, sometimes governmental poli-
cies are so fundamental that extraordinary search schemes
might be justified to maximize the policy's efficient and effec-
tive implementation. For example, education is perhaps the
most important of all governmental functions." Not only
does education provide children with the tools they need to
succeed as productive citizens, but it places a heightened re-
sponsibility on educators to ensure the child's safety and well
being.4' When educators suspect school children are violating
school policy and that their conduct is disruptive to the educa-
tional process, should educators have the authority to conduct
an administrative search without probable cause? The Supreme
Court considered this issue in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and adopted
38. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
39. The Commissioner stated his belief that the United States Customs Set-
vice is largely drug free, and all but a few tests proved negative. Id. at 660, 673.
However, writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy rejected tile contention that
the slight incidence of positive tests did not impugn the program's validity. That
harm was even remotely possible justified the government advancing its goal
thi:ough the testing program. Id. at 674.
40. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
41. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, (1985), (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
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the special needs rationale.4" In T.L.O., school officials caught
a fourteen-year old student and her companion smoking ciga-
rettes in a school lavatory. This conduct violated school
rules, and the two students were taken to the principal's office
where they met with the assistant vice principal."' The stu-
dents denied smoking, which prompted the assistant vice prin-
cipal to open one of the students' purses where cigarettes and
rolling papers were found.45 Seeing the rolling papers, the
assistant vice principal searched the entire purse and found
marijuana and smoking paraphernalia.4" The New Jersey Su-
preme Court ruled that the search was unreasonable. 47 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, using a balancing test
to assess the relationship between the student's individual pri-
vacy interests and the state's "substantial interest in maintain-
ing discipline in the classroom and on school grounds."48 Ar-
guing that the school setting requires close supervision and en-
forcement of rules that would be acceptable if undertaken by a
parent,49 the Court recognized that school officials are placed
in circumstances that often need discipline to ensure effective,
immediate action. Therefore, the Court queried where the
balance should be struck. The majority believed that maintain-
ing a positive learning environment justified easing some of
the restrictions ordinarily imposed on searches by public au-
thorities.5 When judging how much easing of the Fourth
Amendment could be allowed without tainting the reasonable-
ness of the search, the Court argued that:
[l]n certain limited circumstances ... we have recognized
the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions
that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of
probable cause .... Where a careful balancing of govern-
mental and private interests suggests that the public inter-
est is best served by a fourth amendment standard of rea-
42. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
43. Id. at 328.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 463 A.2d. 934 (N.J. 1983).
'18. 469 U.S. at 339.
49. Id. at 343.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 340.
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sonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have
not hesitated to adopt such a standard.52
The Supreme Court's balancing approach in TL.O. was
hardly novel. Balancing in some form had become common-
place since Camara and Teny. However, TL.O. broke ground
by introducing a category of circumstances in which the Court
could further justify invoking extraordinary balancing. As Jus-
tice Blackmun expressed in concurrence, when exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable, a court is entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers.5"
Significantly, the Court in TL.O. argued that some gov-
ernmental objectives should be exempt from traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis. When a court determines that govern-
mental objectives are exceptionally important, it could engage
in Fourth Amendment balancing in a way that effectively ig-
nores the warrant and probable cause command of the Fourth
Amendment.
While common sense might dictate support for the majori-
ty viewpoint in T.L.O., there is an inherent danger in the
Court's adoption of the special needs rationale. The danger is
not so much that balancing occurs, but rather that when gov-
ernmental interests are so often perceived as vital, the result-
ing balancing test mocks individual privacy rights. When the
Supreme Court defines the governmental function as so excep-
tionally important that special needs beyond the normal need
of law enforcement justify inspection schemes normally vulner-
able to the Fourth Amendment, it reduces the resulting balanc-
ing test to one in name only.
Another troubling aspect of the special needs rationale is
that it unreasonably applies the warrantless search justification
premised from the exigent circumstances warrant exception5 4
52. Id. at 340-41.
53. Id. at 351.
54. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983), Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
The Supreme Court has carved an exigency exception to the warrant requirement
when in situations where "the press of time ...makes obtaining a warrant either
impossible or hopelessly infeasible." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissent-
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to allow warrantless searches in areas where obtaining a war-
rant is not impossible or infeasible. Invoking the special needs
rationale, even in cases that pose extraordinary risks to society,
is misplaced if obtaining a warrant is feasible. If it is not feasi-
ble, a warrantless search would still be allowed under the exi-
gency exception. In essence, the special needs rationale dilutes
the exigency exception by no longer requiring a warrant in
non-emergency administrative situations.55
B. Special Needs Expanded to Promote Workplace Efficiency
While the special needs rationale creates the potential for
warrantless searches in situations where obtaining a warrant
was possible, its application in T.L.O. was narrowly applied to
further vital government policy. Since T.L.O., the Supreme
Court has expanded the special needs rationale to approve
very suspect search procedures and searches predicated on
virtually no suspicion at all. The first scenario, where the spe-
cial needs rationale is used to justify a dubious search proce-
dure, is well illustrated in O'Connor v. Ortega.56
O'Connor involved an administrative search of Dr. Ortega's
office at Napa State Hospital." Ortega, a seventeen-year em-
ployee at the hospital, was promoted to Chief of Professional
Education.58 In 1981, Dr. O'Connor, the Executive Director
of the hospital, began suspecting improprieties in Ortega's
management. 59 Questions of sexual harassment and impropri-
eties regarding an Apple computer acquisition led O'Connor
to initiate an investigation on July 31, during which Ortega
agreed to take a two-week vacation and remain off the
hospital's premises.6" On August 14, O'Connor informed
Ortega that the investigation had not been completed and
placed him on administrative leave until his termination on
September 22.61 While Ortega was on leave, a hospital investi-
gative team searched his office several times, seizing both pro-
ing).
55. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987).
56. Id. at 709.
57. Id. at 712.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 713.
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fessional and personal items from his desk and file cabinets.62
No attempts were made to separate personal from professional
items, nor was an inventory made.63
Noting its past decisions in Camara and more recently in
T.L.O., the Supreme Court declared that searches and seizures
by government employees are "subject to the restraints of the
Fourth Amendment."64 However, the Court reasoned there
was "no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy
expectations that society is prepared to accept as reason-
able."65 Thus, the majority in O'Connor believed it was appro-
priate to balance Ortega's expectation of privacy in his busi-
ness office with the government's responsibility to ensure its
employees did not engage in improper behavior.66 The Court
defined the hospital workplace, or that area generally within
the employer's control, as including "hallways, cafeteria, offic-
es, desks, and file cabinets."67 While Ortega may still have en-
joyed some Fourth Amendment rights on state property as a
state employee, 68 the majority believed that operational reali-
ties in the workplace could reduce an employee's privacy ex-
pectations when an intrusion is caused by a supervisor rather
than a law enforcement official. 69 Claiming that it had to bal-
ance Ortega's privacy interests with the government's need for
supervision, control, and efficient operation of the
workplace," the majority noted that a warrant requirement is
not appropriate when obtaining the warrant is likely to "frus-
trate the governmental purpose behind the search."7
62. Id.
63. The investigative team contended that separating state from non-state
property was too much to do, so they just boxed it all up. Id. at 713-14.
64. Id. at 715.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 724-25.
67. Id. at 716.
68. Te majority cited Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968), where it
recognized that employees who had a private office enjoyed a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy against police intrusions, and Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
178 n.8 (1984), in which the Court recognized that an employee's expectation of
privacy is based upon "societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of
the Amendment."
69. 480 U.S. at 717.
70. Id. at 720.
71. Id.
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After rejecting Ortega's contention that the hospital ad-
ministrators needed to obtain a warrant before searching his
office, the majority then speculated about the appropriate
degree of suspicion required to justify the warrantless search.
The Court recognized that in the past, it had not hesitated to
adopt a standard defining a search reasonable with less than
probable cause if doing so would further the public interest. 2
Arguing that the public has a right to expect efficient govern-
mental operations, special government needs beyond the nor-
mal needs of law enforcement" justified wide latitude to en-
ter employees' offices for work-related inspections.7 4 In sum,
the majority concluded that both noninvestigative and investi-
gative administrative searches75 would normally be judged
reasonable at their inception if it seemed reasonable to assume
that the search would uncover incriminating evidence or that
the search was necessary for a noninvestigative work-related
purpose, such as retrieving a needed file. 76 In O'Connor, the
majority held that since the hospital administrators had indi-
vidualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the ensuing warrantless
administrative search of his office was reasonable.7
The decision in O'Connor poses two significant problems
that distinguish it from TL.O. First, the T.L.O. majority recog-
nized that the special needs inherent in maintaining an effi-
cient and effective educational setting obviated school
administrators' requirement to obtain a warrant when. they
discovered disruptive violations of school rules.7' However, in
O'Connor there was no special need to justify dispensing with
the warrant and probable cause requirements.79 At the time
of the searches, Ortega was on administrative leave, forbidden
from entering the hospital premises. The hospital administra-
tors could easily have taken their evidence of Ortega's miscon-
72. Id. at 722.
73. Id. at 724.
74. Id.
75. Administrative searches are given more latitude than criminal searches be-
cause, unlike criminal searches intended to uncover evidence of criminal activity,
administrative searches are intended to uncover code violations or other threats to
public safety.
76. Id. at 726.
77. Id.
78. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
79. 480 U.S. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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duct to a magistrate and obtained a warrant without jeopardiz-
ing an effective and efficient hospital environment."0 Indeed,
if the majority in O'Connor was serious about balancing individ-
ual and governmental interests, requiring a magistrate to ex-
amine the prima facie case for this warrant request could mini-
mize the possibility that an overzealous administrator would
undervalue individual privacy and embark on an overly intru-
sive, procedurally unsound administrative search." Had the
hospital administrators gone to a magistrate, they would have
had to articulate what they intended to find. When the mag-
istrate issued the search warrant, the administrators would
likely have been prevented from generally rummaging through
the doctor's office, desk, and file cabinets, taking and mixing
both personal and work-related items without first inventorying
them.
Second, because the Court majority implied that reason-
able individualized suspicion was not a necessary component
to justify the reasonableness of a search at its inception, 2 in-
dividuals could fall prey to procedurally suspect, warrantless
searches. Even if one concedes the debatable proposition that
there were justifiable special needs in O'Connor, it would be
difficult to justify the warrantless search of Ortega's office.
There, hospital administrators justified a search that seized,
without inventorying, all personal and work-related articles on
the questionable grounds that it would have been administra-
tively inconvenient to keep records that distinguished between
relevant and irrelevant evidence. 3
The implications of O'Connor are troubling. The Supreme
Court argues that it engaged in Fourth Amendment balancing
before justifying the search. The Court's balancing resulted in
the majority defining as reasonable a warrantless search con-
80. Id.
81. Id. at 743 (Blackmun, J., quoting United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)).
82. Since the hospital administrators did have individualized suspicion in this
instance the Court declined to decide whether individualized suspicion is an essen-
tial component of reasonableness. Id. at 726. However, in the most recent special
needs case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668
(1989), the Court held that the Government's need to "conduct the suspicionless
searches required by the Customs program outweighs the privacy interests of em-
ployees."
83. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713-14.
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ducted in an unreasonable, if not arbitrary and capricious man-
ner, even when there was ample time to obtain a warrant. This
type of balancing signals the Court's reluctance to give much,
if any, weight to individual Fourth Amendment privacy claims.
If T.L.O. established that special governmental needs be-
yond normal law enforcement could justify a warrantless
search to ensure the maintenance of vital government inter-
ests, O'Connor further strengthened government's position in
the special needs balancing test. Two reasons support this
conclusion. First, when the Supreme Court accepts the notion
that special needs automatically justify governmental search
policies that promote an efficient and effective workplace, and
merely assumes that obtaining a warrant would frustrate gov-
ernment objectives' it rejects the rationale of TL.O. T.L.O.
held that if time delays inherent in the warrant process could
exacerbate disruptions in the school setting, a warrantless
search could be justified. However, it is unlikely that serious
disruptions would have taken place at the hospital if the ad-
ministrators in O'Connor spent an hour or two to obtain a
search warrant.
Second, because the majority in O'Connor viewed the
inspectors' search methods as reasonable, even though they
lacked any standards to protect the integrity of the.search, the
majority appears willing to overlook, or at least undervalue, the
second prong of the Terry test that determines a search's rea-
sonableness.8 4 Any search that lacks intent to distinguish be-
tween relevant and irrelevant evidence, and especially without
any inventory procedures, is clearly contrary to Terry's require-
ment that searches be "reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." 5 Yet the majority concluded that a reasonable search
did not require a hospital -inventorying policy. As long as a
search intends to secure state property, the scope of the intru-
sion would meet reasonableness standards.8 6 However, with-
out an inventorying system, there is little incentive for investi-
gators to confine their search to state property. More general-
84. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
85. Id. According to the standard stated in Tei~y, the search in O'Connor
should have been limited to items suspected of being improperly secured and not
include personal and other irrelevant items that may have been in Ortega's office.
86. O'Conno,; 480 U.S. at 728.
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ly, O'Connor suggests that there is little incentive for govern-
ment to articulate a clear and convincing nexus between a
search, any items seized and the purpose of the search.
O'Connor signalled a significant erosion of the balancing
test in special needs cases. Evident in O'Connor was the Su-
preme Court's willingness to summarily argue that an efficient
and effective government workplace is in itself a special need
justifying a warrantless administrative search. As a result of
O'Connor, special needs analysis is no longer confined to
whether a warrantless search could neutralize immediate
threats to vital government policy. O'Connor extends the special
needs rationale to warrantless searches that foster an efficient
and effective workplace in non-vital government operations.
C. Special Needs Expanded to Promote Supervisory Powers
The Supreme Court further strengthened special needs
analysis when it held in Griffin v. Wisconsin87 that warrants
were unnecessary when probation officers wished to search a
probationer's residence.8" In Griffin, the majority ignored
Griffin's privacy interests in his home, despite the conclusion
that "[a] probationer's home, like anyone else's, is protected by
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be 'rea-
sonable."'89 The Court justified this significant intrusion and
declared the warrantless search reasonable because "[a] State's
operation of [its] probation system, like its operation of a
school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a
regulated industry, . . . present[ed] 'special needs' beyond nor-
mal law enforcement" that justified relaxed Fourth Amend-
ment procedural requirements.90
The Supreme Court justified the search of Griffin's resi-
dence because the probation officer had a tip that Griffin
" 'had' or 'may have had' " a weapon at the home.9' The ma-
jority in Griffin believed that subjecting the officer to the war-
rant requirement would have interfered with the probation
system, impeded the officer's ability to respond quickly to
87. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
88. Id. at 875-76.
89. Id. at 873.
90. Id. at 873-74.
91. Id. at 875-76 (citing State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535, 544 (Wis. 1986)).
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misfeasance, and reduced the deterrent effect resulting from
an expeditious search.92 Furthermore, the Court justified in-
voking the special needs rationale to protect the community
from a potentially dangerous probationer. 3 However, the
majority's reasoning is misplaced. While some states have insti-
tuted intensive surveillance programs [ISP] aimed at reducing
felony recidivism,94 Wisconsin had not instituted an ISP.
Rather, the search of Griffin's residence was haphazard and
even violated state regulations outlining circumstances when a
probationer's residence could be searched.95 Additionally,
Griffin was on probation for misdemeanor charges, suggesting
the ISP concept to be inapplicable in the present circum-
stance. 6
Equally important, the majority justified the warrantless
search by arguing that obtaining a warrant would have hin-
dered a quick response to a potentially dangerous situation.
However, the probation supervisor waited two to three hours
after receiving the tip before searching Griffin's residence. 7
Had there truly been a compelling need to search Griffin's
residence without delay, the exigent circumstances exception
would have justified a warrantless search. 8
Finally, the majority argued that special deterrent needs
justify this warrantless search. While the Griffin majority ar-
gued that warrantless searches would help protect the commu-
nity from the risk posed by probationers at large, 9 the state
admitted that over eighty percent of its probationers success-
92. Id. at 876.
93. Id. at 875.
94. See Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Gov-
ernment Peispective: Whose Amendment is it Anyway, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 669,
721-22 (1988).
95. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 328.21(6) (April 1990) prescribes circumstances
upon which the Department of Health and Social Services can implement a search
of a probationer's residence, all of which were lacking in the present circum-
stance. State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d. 535, 545 (Wis. 1986) (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
96. Intensive Surveillance Programs are designed to better monitor felons
who, because they were convicted of a felony, theoretically pose a greater safety
risk to society. It seems less likely that a probationer convicted of a misdemeanor,
as was the case in Griffin, poses nearly the same potential threat to society.
97. Gifflin, 483 U.S. at 885 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted
that had the police, rather than a probation officer, investigated the petitioner's
residence, they would have been required to obtain a warrant. Id.
98. See Strossen, supra note 5.
99. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
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fully complete probation.'00 This statistic suggests that proba-
tioners may not pose significant risks to the community. The
Court's logic is troubling because the state could easily argue
that for the sake of safeguarding the public from recidivist
dangers, criminally convicted citizens should be subject to
warrantless searches.
As in O'Connor, the majority in Griffin is primarily con-
cerned with maximizing government efficiency. Special needs
is loosely construed, enabling government to overcome incon-
veniences placed on it by the Fourth Amendment. By elimi-
nating the magistrate's role by citing special governmental
needs, government personnel are no longer deterred from
conducting some searches that a magistrate might have other-
wise prohibited. O'Connor and Griffin clearly indicate that the
Supreme Court views Fourth Amendment procedures as a
burden. Yet the Framers were willing to sacrifice speed and
efficiency to protect against unrestrained governmental pow-
er.' O' One might even postulate that any contemporary bal-
ancing test is unnecessary since the Framers had already set-
tled the balance in favor of the individual.
In T.L.O., O'Connor and Griffin, the special needs rationale
was used to uphold warrantless searches to maximize efficient
and effective government service delivery. In each of these
cases, some level of individualized suspicion was present which
undoubtedly helped support the government's position that
the search was justified. While these cases weaken traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court further erod-
ed Fourth Amendment protection, in New York v. Burger,1" 2
when it used the special needs rationale to accept
suspicionless, warrantless searches. In this case, the Supreme
Court upheld a suspicionless administrative search of a junk-
yard operator in an attempt to discover and deter traders in
stolen automobile parts.'0" The majority argued that since
the junkyard was a closely regulated business, it enjoyed re-
duced privacy expectations.' 4 Since closely regulated indus-
100. See Maclin, supra note 94, at 724.
101. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, De-
velopment and Future of the Exclusionaty Rule in Seairh-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
102. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
103. Id. at 712-18.
104. Id. at 699-707. The Supreme Court has developed a long series of prece-
[Vol. 32
SPECIAL NEEDS
tries have reduced privacy expectations, the Supreme Court
ruled that it was reasonable for those industries to expect rou-
tine property inspections.
In Burger, New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law" 5 autho-
rized the police to conduct suspicionless searches of vehicle
dismantlers, automobile junkyards and related businesses.'0 6
The Court argued that the special needs rationale subjects
pervasively-regulated businesses to warrantless, suspicionless
searches. Thus, the majority held as reasonable a warrantless
search of Burger's junkyard, which uncovered stolen property
and ultimately led to a criminal conviction.0 7 The majority
concluded the resulting warrantless inspection would meet the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirements as long as
the government could: (1) show a substantial government in-
terest to justify the inspection,' (2) demonstrate that the
inspection was "necessary to further [the] regulatory
scheme"'0 9 and (3) demonstrate that "the statute's inspection
program ... provid[ed] a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant," including adequately advising proprietors of the
defined business that inspections should be expected."0
The decision in Burger is significant because it extends
special needs searches beyond vital and non-vital government
enterprises that are not particularly hazardous, to inspection
schemes regulating private industries not fundamentally impor-
tant, but arguably requiring close regulation."' In Burger,
special needs is not used to help efficiently and effectively
dents where deference is accorded statutory regulations of businesses deemed by a
legislative body in particular need of close supervision. See id. at 699-703
(Blackmun, J.) (discussing the administrative search exception to the warrant
requirement in pervasively regulated industries).
105. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986).
106. Bu~ger, 482 U.S. at 694.
107. Id. at 708.
108. Id. at 702.
109. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)).
110. Id. at 703 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
111. Pervasive regulation is normally confined to industries that are in them-
selves particularly hazardous, or are furthered by external hazardous activity. See,
e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor indus-
try), United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms and ammunitions
sales), Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining industry). Generally, the
pervasive regulation rationale espoused in Camara is assumed where there is
substantial public and judicial acceptance for the need to periodically inspect an
industry. See Lovvorn v. Cityof Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1546 (6th Cir. 1988).
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deliver an important government service, but instead to effi-
ciently and effectively carry out an inspection scheme of busi-
nesses that are pervasively regulated. Of equal importance,
Burger ties the logic of a special needs search, originally justi-
fied for administrative purposes, to the criminal context since
evidence found from this administrative search ultimately led
to a criminal conviction.
D. Special Needs Expanded to Search Persons
Until the Supreme Court decided National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab..2 and Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association," 3 the pervasively- regulated industry
rationale had been confined to inspections of premises and
property. However, utilizing the special needs rationale, the
Supreme Court expanded the constitutionality of warrantless
searches of property and premises based on some quantum of
individualized suspicion, to warrantless searches of people
without any particular, individualized suspicion.
In Von Raab, the Commissioner of the United States Cus-
toms Service, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury,
announced plans to implement a drug testing program" 4 as
a condition of placement or employment for positions that
were directly involved in drug interdiction, for persons carry-
ing firearms, or for persons with access to classified materi-
al." 5 Customs agents who tested positive and could not ex-
plain the result to the agency's satisfaction were subject to
dismissal."'1
Petitioner, National Treasury Employees Union, argued
the drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause it was not based on any degree of probable cause or
112. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
113. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
114. While the Commissioner admitted his belief that the Customs Service was
"largely drug free," effectively negating any individual employee suspicion, he justi-
fied tile program oil the belief that "no segment of society is immune from the
threat of illegal drug use." 489 U.S. at 660 (citing U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, CUS-
TOMS U.S.A., Fiscal Year 1985, 4). Even though only five employees out of 3600
tested positive for drugs, the Coinmissioner justified the drug testing program on
tile basis that his employees could conceivably use drugs, not because he suspect-
ed particular employees were using drugs. Id. at 660, 673.
115. Id. at 660-61.
116. Id. at 663.
[Vol. 32
1992] SPECIAL NEEDS
reasonable suspicion." 7 However, the Supreme Court upheld
the drug testing plan with regard to employees who applied
"for promotion to positions directly involving" drug interdic-
tion"' and to positions that required carrying firearms."'
Although the majority recognized that governmental drug
testing programs were Fourth Amendment searches,120 the
Supreme Court bypassed Fourth Amendment scrutiny by ap-
plying the special needs rationale. While the majority recog-
nized that some level of individualized suspicion was the rule,
it was not essential to determine reasonableness in all cas-
es.' 2 ' It argued that when special governmental needs are
present, a balance must be struck between an individual's pri-
vacy expectations and government's need to take measures
beyond normal law enforcement to ensure that government's
special needs are met. 2
2
The Supreme Court reasoned that obtaining a warrant in
this instance would only divert resources away from the
agency's primary purpose.2 3 It further opined that since the
agency's drug testing program was a noncriminal, administra-
tive search, the probable cause standard was not particularly
suitable when judging the validity of drug testing pro-
grams. 11 Ultimately, the majority synthesized past adminis-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 679.
119. id.
120. Id. at 665. While lower courts have consistently ruled that drug testing
programs were searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court had not had the occasion to resolve the issue until it decided
Skinner and Von Raab. Id.
121. Id. at 668.
122. Id.
123. The Supreme Court reasoned that obtaining a warrant, an administrative
and fiscal inconvenience, would do little to add protection to one's personal
privacy. Id. at 666-67. However, it seems unlikely that a detached and neutral
magistrate would accept a warrant application absent, at the very least, reasonable
suspicion, let alone probable cause.
124. Id. at 668. The Supreme Court recognized past precedents that distin-
guishI between traditional probable cause in the criminal context, and the reason-
ableness test to determine probable cause in the administrative context. See Colo-
rado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 370 (1976)) (indicating that the probable cause approach is not
helpful for routine administrative functions); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
723 (1987) (stating that the appropriate standard for administrative searches is not
probable cause in its traditional meaning); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 535-36 (1967) (developing a reasonableness test conception of probable cause
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trative search cases into a rule of thumb suggesting govern-
ment could compel suspicionless searches to uncover "latent or
hidden conditions" 12 5 that could pose a threat to the health
and safety of government employees and society. Taking judi-
cial notice of the perception of widespread drug use in the
United States, the majority concluded that suspicionless drug
testing of certain customs employees outweighed the privacy
rights normally guaranteed to them by the Fourth
Amendment.1
6
In dictum, the Supreme Court further recognized that
"'operational realities of the workplace' may render entirely
reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and
co-workers that might be unreasonable in other contexts."
27
In Von Raab, the Court thought it was reasonable for customs
agents involved in the direct interdiction of illegal drugs and
those carrying firearms to expect the kind of privacy intrusion
involved in a drug test.
28
The majority was not persuaded by the petitioner's con-
tention that the suspicionless drug testing program was further
flawed because it failed to detect an agency-wide drug use
problem. 29 The petitioner claimed that a complete absence
of any suspicion negated any government right to intrude on
employee privacy rights.' Rejecting this argument, the Su-
preme Court reasoned the drug testing programs served two
purposes. First, drug testing programs can detect drug use and
second, they can deter potential drug use.' 3 ' The fact that an
to justify noncriminal building inspections to help prevent hazardous conditions to
public health and safety); and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557
(1967) (noting that requiring individualized suspicion to make stops on highways
near the Mexican border would be administratively impractical).
125. 489 U.S. at 668-69.
126. Id. at 672.
127. Id. at 671 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987)). See,
e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (allowing the CIA to impose re-
strictions on employee activities, including submitting proposed publications for re-
view).
128. 489 U.S. at 676-77.
129. Id. at 673-74.
130. Id. at 673.
131. In justifying the drug test, the Supreme Court looked to the drug testing
plan's deterrent effect. It argued "[w]here, as here, the possible harm against
which the government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occur-
rence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance
the government's goal." Id. at 674-75.
[Vol. 32112,
SPECIAL NEEDS
agency may not have any perceptible employee drug use was
not sufficient to deny the validity of a drug testing plan.132
The Supreme Court viewed the possible deterrent effect at
least as compelling a justification for drug testing programs as
its ability to detect drug use. 33
Von Raab further strengthened the special needs rationale.
Von Raab expanded the scope of special needs beyond Burger,
which allowed suspicionless searches of property in
heavily-regulated businesses, to suspicionless searches of per-
sons. As a result of Burger and Von Raab, the Supreme Court
appears willing to accept suspicionless searches of either prop-
erty or individuals when the government contends that the
search will advance government interests.
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court viewed drug use as such
a substantial evil that extraordinary detection measures seemed
reasonable.'3 4 In this context, suspicionless drug testing as a
means to detect and deter drug use did not contravene the
reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment. 3 5 The United
States Customs Service and the court majority were not as
concerned with detection as they were with deterrence.3 6
Therefore, the majority in Von Raab appeared willing to cir-
cumvent Fourth Amendment protection by engaging in mas-
sive, suspicionless searches as a means to induce particular
behavior patterns in society.
Invoking special needs to justify mass, suspicionless search-
es mocks the Fourth Amendment's deterrent effect on govern-
ment. Fourth Amendment policies are intended to deter gov-
ernment from engaging in unreasonable searches.3 7 Howev-
er, in Von Raab, the majority ignored Fourth Amendment re-
quirements and instead allowed an oppressive policy intended
132. Id. at 674.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 679.
136. Id. at 674-675.
137. Discussions of the Fourth Amendment's deterrent effect abound. For
example, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court argued that
the exclusionary rule would be an effective deterrent to unscrupulous police
behavior. Even when reducing the procedural requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court is cautious if the policy will reduce the deterrent effect
on government officials. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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to deter citizens from behavior that it conceded was not occur-
ring.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association'38 used the special needs rationale to
accept the constitutionality of drug testing programs imple-
mented on railroad employees.' Like the junkyards in Bur-
ger, the railroad was privately run. 4° Again similar to Burger,
substantial regulations imposed on the rail industry enabled
the Supreme Court to rule the railroad's drug testing program
tantamount to public sector action, therefore giving the rail-
road employees the right to raise Fourth Amendment objec-
tions.
41
The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970142 authorized
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to promulgate reg-
ulations prohibiting covered employees from using or possess-
ing alcohol or any controlled substances. 43  Specifically,
subpart C required drug testing of employees when they were
involved in a train accident that resulted in a fatality, the re-
lease of hazardous materials accompanied by an evacuation, or
a reportable injury or damage to railroad property of at least
$500,000.144 Employees were also required to take a drug
test when an "impact accident" resulted in a reportable inju-
ry,145 or when an accident occurred that resulted in an
on-duty employee fatality. 46 While a train accident might
create suspicion of drug use, the regulations required drug
tests of all crew members, not just those directly responsible
for the accident.
47
138. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
139. Id. at 618-21.
140. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is empowered to promulgate
industry-wide regulations. See id. at 606.
141. Justice Kennedy argued that the scope and tone of the government
regulations suggest the government's affirmation toward drug testing. Id. at 615.
142. 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1982) allows the Secretary of Transportation to "pre-
scribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all
areas of railroad safety."
143. 49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(1) (1990).
144. Id. § 219.201(a)(1).
145. Id. § 219.201(a)(2).
146. Id. § 219.201(a)(3).
147. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 609 (1989).
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The Supreme Court recognized that the railroad employ-
ees enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection.14 It also implied
that the drug testing scheme would have failed traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis. 49 However, it found that spe-
cial governmental needs to protect society from harm may
shield the drug testing program from traditional Fourth
Amendment scrutiny5 ° in this heavily regulated industry. In
this policy area, any employee privacy expectations inferred
from the Fourth Amendment were minimal compared with the
compelling government interest of ensuring railroad safe-
ty. 5 ' As the Court noted in Von Raab, suspicionless drug
testing serves both detection and deterrent purposes.'52 The
majority believed that requiring a warrant or basing the drug
testing program on individualized suspicion would impede the
government's efforts to detect and deter drug use. 153
The impact of both Von Raab and Skinner is significant. It
invites regulatory agencies to justify suspicionless drug testing
programs of job applicants, government personnel in
safety-sensitive positions and employees in
pervasively-regulated industries. Prior to Von Raab and Skinner,
efficient and effective workplaces were the primary justifica-
tions framing special needs analysis. However, Von Raab and
Skinner add concepts such as deterrence, employee integrity
and human safety to the existing parameters that may justify
special needs searches. At the very least, Von Raab and Skinner
appear to clear the way for government to adopt suspicionless
drug testing programs in a significant portion of the public
and private sector. The expanded scope of reasons justifying a
special needs approach articulated in Von Raab and Skinner
and the existing justifications for special needs analysis articu-
lated in cases prior to Von Raab and Skinner, means lower
court judges have ample precedent to permissively apply the
special needs rationale.
148. Id. at 614-16.
149. Id. at 619.
150. Id. at 620.
151. Id. at 627-28.
152. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674
(1989).
153. Id. at 665-68.
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In sum, the Supreme Court developed an analytical tool
courts could utilize in a wide range of Fourth Amendment
challenges. They expanded the special needs rationale in
T.L.O, Ortega and Griffin from searches of places and things to
better ensure efficient service delivery to the bodily intrusions
evident in Von Raab and Skinner to control individual lifestyle
choices. The following section analyzes how the lower courts
have responded to this new strain of Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis. While the response time to Von Raab and Skinner has
been short, lower court trends suggest the special needs ratio-
nale will be used to further erode Fourth Amendment
protections against suspicionless searches.
V. BEYOND VON RAAB AND SKINNER: RECENT LOWER COURT
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS RATIONALE
Given the recent proliferation of drug testing programs
juxtaposed with the Supreme Court's application of the special
needs rationale in Von Raab and Skinner, recent lower court
special needs decisions have generally been associated with
drug testing disputes. With few exceptions, drug testing pro-
grams have been a primary, but not exclusive,"' focus for
special needs analysis. Yet few concrete principles guide appli-
cation of the doctrine. While the Supreme Court has left little
doubt it endorses a broad application of the special needs ra-
tionale, lower court judges have disagreed over the appropriate
scope of the rationale's application.
In both Von Raab and Skinner, the Supreme Court cumula-
tively accepted three justifications to support application of the
special needs rationale in Fourth Amendment drug testing
disputes. First, the Supreme Court argued that protecting the
integrity of certain employees was a valid special governmental
need justifying drug tests of that identified group. For exam-
ple, this argument was specifically applied in Von Raab, where
the Court suggested that government had a responsibility to
ensure that employees who were directly involved in drug in-
terdiction were not using drugs. 55 The Court also suggested
that drug tests could be used to deter employees from using
154. See, e.g., Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d. 1188 (10th Cir. 1989) using special
needs to accept AIDS testing in prisons.
155. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670.
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drugs, thereby furthering the professional integrity of that tar-
geted group. Second, the Supreme Court argued that ensuring
public safety was an appropriate special need justifying
suspicionless drug tests. Finally, the Court believed that pro-
tecting sensitive information was a valid government need justi-
fying drug testing programs.
However, in Von Raab and Skinner the drug tests were
required only once and only on individuals who, if impaired,
could theoretically pose immediate, irreparable harm to the
public. It is unclear how lower courts will apply the special
needs rationale in settings distinguishable from Von Raab and
Skinner.
The first significant lower court special needs case decided
after Von Raab and Skinner narrowly construed the doctrine. In
Harmon v. Thornburgh,'56 the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia examined the constitu-
tionality of a comprehensive drug testing plan for several types
of Department of Justice employees. ChiefJudge Wald narrow-
ly construed the broad special needs principles emanating
from Von Raab and Skinner and held unconstitutional most of
the categories of the Justice Department's drug testing plan.
Harmon involved a Department of Justice's random drug
testing program for incumbents having access to top secret
classified information, 157 all attorneys and support personnel
involved in grand jury proceedings, 5 ' all incumbent presi-
dential appointments, 59 all incumbents who prosecute crimi-
nal cases °GO and all employees who help maintain, store and
safeguard controlled substances.' 6 ' Noting that drug tests
were possibly valid searches 6 ' from a special needs perspec-
tive,'63 even absent generalized suspicion of a drug prob-
lem,' 64 the D.C. Circuit in Harmon still invalidated most of
156. 878 F.2d. 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
157. Id. at 486.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 487 (citing Skinne?, 489 U.S. at 614 and Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
664).
163. Id. at 488 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 and Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
664).
164. Id. at 487-88 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674).
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the Justice Department's drug testing plan. The Court distin-
guished several aspects of the Department's plan and its em-
ployees from the circumstances in both Von Raab and Skinner.
First, the Department of Justice working environment was
more traditional than customs agents or railway employees and
therefore could more easily be subjected to traditional
day-to-day scrutiny for drug impairment.'65 Second, because
the Justice Department's drug testing scheme allowed periodic
tests during the targeted employees' career, it was far more
intrusive 66 than the one time tests formulated in both Von
Raab and Skinner.'67 Third, and perhaps most important, be-
cause Department of Justice employees were not directly
linked to law enforcement drug interdiction policies, or other-
wise linked to the public in dangerous situations, they posed
less immediate danger to the public.'
68
Relying on Von Raab, the Justice Department argued its
drug testing plan was constitutional because of its special need
to ensure the integrity of its workforce, to safeguard the public
and to protect sensitive information. 69 The department's
broadest theory was that Von Raab allowed random testing of
all federal employees to maximize the integrity of the public
workforce.' Rejecting this argument, Chief Judge Wald be-
lieved the integrity argument only applied if a nexus could be
established linking the responsibilities of federal employees to
law enforcement that was directly related to drug inter-
diction.' 7 '
The Justice Department also contended that drug testing
was justified to ensure public safety. Rejecting this view, Chief
Judge Wald distinguished between remote and immediate
threats to public safety. While a single mistake by a customs
agent or a train engineer may have irremediable consequenc-
165. Haninon, 878 F.2d at 489.
166. Id. While Judge Wald recognized that multiple testing plans are more in-
trusive, thereby possibly increasing employee claims that the tests are unreason-
able, he believed it unnecessary to include this distinction in his analysis of the
constitutionality of the Department of Justice plan. Rather, his analysis focused
exclusively on the criteria discussed in Von Raab and Skinner. Id.
'167. Id.
168. Id. at 490.
169. Id. at 489-90.
170. Id. at 490.
171. Id.
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es,'7 2 "Von Raab provides no basis for extending this princi-
ple to the Justice Department, where the chain of causation
between misconduct and injury is considerably more attenuat-
ed."173
Finally, Chief Judge Wald narrowly construed protecting
sensitive information to only those employees who have a top
secret national security clearance. 174 If access to any informa-
tion which is confidential or closed to the public were justifica-
tion enough for a drug test, too many types of employees, in-
cluding clerks, typists and messengers would fall under the
drug testing scheme. 175 Therefore, only those employees with
top secret security clearances could properly be tested under
the Justice Department's drug testing scheme.
However, less than a month after Harmon, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held in American Federation
of Government Employees v. Cavazos'76 that a drug testing pro-
gram involving four percent of the Department of Education
employees was, with one exception,'77 constitutional. 178 Re-
lying on the special needs rationale as applied in Von Raab and
Skinner,'79 the district court held that drug tests were accept-
able for all targeted employees except data processors. Mr.
Cavazos' personal guard, who was required to carry a gun, fit
the special need to ensure public safety,8 ° as did motor vehi-
cle operators.'' The district court rejected the plaintiffs ar-
gument that since there was no past evidence that Education
Department vehicle operators had posed public safety threats,
there were no special needs justifying drug testing for this
group of employees.' Rather, the district court relied on
172. Id. at 491.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 491-92.
175. Id. at 492.
176. 721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989).
177. The district court cited Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491- 92, to strike down the
Department of Education's requirement to test data processors since they did not
have a top secret security clearance. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1376.
178. Id. at 1377.
179. d. at 1367-70.
180. Id. at 1372.
181. Id. at 1372-74.
182. Id. at 1373.
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Von Raab, which held evidence demonstrating a drug use prob-
lem was not required as a condition for drug testing. 18
A. Problems With Special Needs Methodology
Both Harmon and Cavazos demonstrate a significant dilem-
ma that inherently plagues the special needs rationale. There is
no objective methodology upon which to apply special needs
criteria uniformly. Without a consistent methodology, its ap-
plication will inevitably depend on how particular judges weigh
the claims of the disputing parties. Even though current
Fourth Amendment analysis has generally favored the
government's position in Fourth Amendment disputes, a trend
sympathetic toward broad special needs application may be
developing. While a few cases like Harmon have rejected the
integrity and safety component of the special needs rationale
for public employees who are not directly involved in law en-
forcement activities,' 84 most cases subsequent to Von Raab
and Skinner have expanded the scope of at least one of the
three special needs justifications the Supreme Court used to
accept public drug testing schemes. The trend appears to sup-
port the government's ability to engage in repeated drug tests,
without any showing of individual or generalized suspicion.
B. Broad Application of the Special Needs Rationale
Brown v. City of Detroit8 5 illustrates this trend. In Brown,
the district court dissolved a temporary restraining order
against Detroit's random, periodic drug tests on Detroit police
183. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
184. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 725 F. Supp. 87 (D.
Mass. 1989), rejecting the integrity and safety argument for postal workers, even
those who deliver mail, because their responsibilities do not actively threaten
public safety nor are they susceptible to threats to the integrity of their employ-
ment because of drug use. Similarly, see National Treasury Employees Union v.
Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1989), rejecting the Energy Department's drug
testing for motor vehicle operators because they pose no greater threat to public
safety than when the general public uses a motor vehicle. See also Dimeo v.
Griffin, 721 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. I1. 1989), rejecting both the integrity and safety
arguments advanced by the Illinois Racing Board in its attempt to conduct ran-
don, suspicionless drug tests on several types of employees involved in the horse
racing industry.
185. 715 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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officers.'86 The plaintiffs argued that Von Raab was not appli-
cable since the Detroit plan required repeated random drug
tests and therefore was more intrusive than the test scheme in
Von Raab.'87 The district court rejected this argument and
instead relied on the public safety arm of the special needs
rationale adopted in Von Raab.'88 The lower court argued
that, like customs agents involved in drug interdiction or rail-
road engineers, one accident of a police officer could seriously
threaten public safety.'89 Clearly, Brown recognizes the laud-
able goal of furthering public safety but, in so doing, underval-
ues other arguments at odds with the government's special
need to ensure public safety.
Similarly, in American Federation of Government Employees v.
Skinner'90 the court ruled that random, suspicionless drug
tests given to Department of Transportation employees did not
violate Fourth Amendment principles. The Court recognized
the Department of Transportation's random drug testing poli-
cy was "vastly more intrusive than the limited drug testing ap-
proved by the Supreme Court,"' 9 ' that there was no conclu-
sive evidence that Transportation Department employees were
using drugs,' 92 and further, that there was simply no correla-
tion between a positive drug test and on the job impair-
ment. 93 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit Court still ruled the
program constitutional because deterrence, not just detection,
was an appropriate goal to further the public safety compo-
nent of the special needs rationale.'94
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bluestein
v. Skinner'95 expanded the scope of the special needs ratio-
nale articulated in Von Raab to justify random drug tests with
no prior notice.'96 In Bluestein, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, while admitting there was not a drug problem in the
186. Id. at 832.
187. Id. at 833.
188. Id. at 834.
189. Id. at 834-35.
190. 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
191. Id. at 889.
192. Id. at 895.
193. Id. at 896.
194. Id. at 896-97.
195. 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990).
196. Id. at 457.
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aviation industry," 7 still ordered random testing of employ-
ees identified in safety-sensitive positions. 9 ' The tests would
be given on the same day the employees were notified, at
times within two hours of notification. 199
The petitioners challenged the drug testing procedure
arguing that the tests were unreasonable searches because
there was no individual or general suspicion of drug use,
200
and that they were substantially more intrusive than the proce-
dures prescribed in Von Raab because the tests were unan-
nounced.20 ' However, the Ninth Circuit, relying on the deter-
rence arm of the special needs rationale, rejected both argu-
ments.
202
Relying on Von Raab, the appellate court argued that the
drug testing procedure served the special need of deterring
203airline industry employees from drug use. While recogniz-
ing that employees' privacy rights were being threatened, the
Ninth Circuit argued that the government's interests in deter-
rence outweighed individual privacy rights.20 4 The court was
unsympathetic with the petitioners' attempt to distinguish Von
Raab from Bluestein. The petitioners argued that since Von
Raab's drug test is activated only in certain situations, i.e., ap-
plying for particular positions, 2 5 it should be distinguished
from Bluestein where testing is not predicated on any predeter-
mined conditions.06 The petitioners contended, and the
court agreed, that this distinction substantially elevated individ-
ual privacy interests.20 7 Yet while recognizing that the condi-
tions of the drug testing scheme in Bluestein were more intru-
sive on individual privacy than the testing in Von Raab, the
court believed the employees' privacy status was still insuffi-
197. The FAA justified the drug testing plan by merely asserting there was
concrete evidence of drug use in the commercial aviation sector. Id. at 453.
198. Id. at 457.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 456.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 457
203. /d.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 456.
206. Id. at 457
207. Id. at 456.
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cient to outweigh the public interest implicit in the Federal
Aviation Administration's drug testing plan.
208
This logic is troublesome and demonstrates how the lower
courts can expand the application of the special needs ratio-
nale to further strengthen the government's position in the
balancing equation. This application hastens the erosion of the
strict scrutiny standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and supplants it with a reasonableness test that overvalues the
public interest. If the special needs rationale, in the name of
potential deterrence, is used to justify governmental intrusions
on individual autonomy without first demonstrating individual-
ized suspicion, government will be able to successfully circum-
vent even minimal Fourth Amendment due process standards.
This problem is well demonstrated in Taylor v. O'Grady, °°
where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals argued that Von
Raab and Skinner denied the necessity to impose the least re-
strictive means test to assess the constitutionality of programs
aimed at curbing employee drug use. 1° In O'Grady, the ap-
pellate court argued that the "reasonableness of any particular
government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on
the existence of alternative less intrusive means."
21
'
The special needs application in O'Grady is problematic
because it ignores what was once a common principal compo-
nent of the strict scrutiny standard: that when establishing
government programs that intrude on fundamental freedoms,
government must utilize the least intrusive means possible. 12
If O'Grady's interpretation becomes commonplace, citizens
208. Id. at 456-57.
209. 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
210. The court in O'Grdy recognized that both Von Raab and Skinner support
urinalysis programs without any level of individualized suspicion. Id. at 1194.
Therefore, having implicitly minimized the degree of the employees' privacy
interest, the appellate court believed Von Raab and Skinner denied the requirement
for least restrictive analysis when balancing societal and individual interests. Id. at
1195.
211. Id. at 1195 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 629 n.9 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983))).
212. The Fourth Amendment was explicitly recognized as a fundamental
freedom when it was incorporated in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). Therefore, any legislative or administrative classification must not abridge
Fourth Amendment rights absent a compelling government justification and then
only employing the least restrictive means. For a concise discussion of the re-
lationship between fundamental freedoms and least restrictive analysis, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 772-74 (2d ed. 1988).
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should no longer fear individual behavior, but rather the
threat of overly intrusive, abusive government policies whose
unconstitutionality is too easily shielded with the special needs
rationale.
In what may become an indication of judicial reaction to
AIDS testing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Leckelt v.
Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 1213 recently af-
firmed an administrative decision to dismiss a licensed nurse
who refused to take an AIDS test.214 In this case, the hospital
required Leckelt to take an AIDS test because hospital admin-
istrators suspected he was gay and believed he lived with a
roommate who had AIDS.215 Rejecting Leckelt's privacy
claims, the Fifth Circuit argued that the public safety arm of
the special needs rationale outweighed Leckelt's considerable
privacy rights.16 Citing Von Raab, the appellate court rec-
ognized a compelling interest in the safe and efficient public
workplace. 217 Therefore, the forced AIDS test was deemed
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.218
This AIDS case, juxtaposed with the drug testing cases,
indicates how much leeway courts are willing to give adminis-
trators to probe into the private lives of their employees. Be-
cause it seems intuitively reasonable in a hospital setting that
supervisors know the health status of their employees, adminis-
trators, using Leckelt as a cue, may expand AIDS testing to
increasingly nebulous categories of employees. Certainly this
trend is clear with drug testing programs and it seems reason-
able that the trend will expand to other policy areas adminis-
trators may perceive as a threat to public safety.
C. Narrow Applications of the Special Needs Rationale
Though the trend in the lower courts clearly accepts the
special needs rationale, there is some debate about how ex-
pansively the doctrine should be applied. In Dimeo v. Grif-
fin,219 the district court rejected a special needs justification
213. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
214. Id. at 823.
215. Id. at 822.
216. Id. at 832-33.
217. Id. at 833.
218. Id.
219. 721 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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to impose drug testing on a variety of employees involved in
the horse racing industry."' The district court distinguished
Dimeo from Von Raab and Skinner in several respects. First,
unlike Von Raab and Skinner, the drug tests in Dimeo were
random, not predicated on any degree of individualized suspi-
cion.22' Second, while recognizing that the racing board,
which imposed the tests, had a responsibility to ensure the
integrity of the racing industry, the district court believed the
Board was stretching the integrity arm of the special needs
rationale when it justified drug tests as a means to prevent
decreases in state revenue.222 If one were to accept random
employee drug tests on the basis that impaired employees in-
crease operating costs and jeopardize potential gate revenue,
virtually all employees, including judges,223 university profes-
sors,
2 2 4 and state legislators,22 5 could be tested to ensure
the integrity of their respective professions. Third, the district
court rejected the Board's assertion that the safety arm of the
special needs rationale justified testing employees such as out-
riders and parade marshals because they are only remotely
exposed to any physical risk.226 It also distinguished the safe-
ty argument applied in Von Raab and Skinner from the present
case because the risk in the former cases more directly in-
volved the public, whereas in Dimeo the safety concerns in-
volved the employees themselves. 227 The district court felt
that the link between a positive drug test and current impair-
ment was so tenuous that one could not justify the conclusion
that a positive drug test seriously increased the risk of harm in
the racing industry. 228 Finally, the district court argued that
without concrete evidence that drug tests significantly deterred
drug use, the deterrent arm of the special needs rationale sim-
ply could not be used to justify drug tests under these condi-
tions.229 In light of these conclusions, the district court be-
220. Id. at 973.
221. Id. at 966.
222. Id. at 967-68.
223. Id. at 968.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 969.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. The district court was not rejecting the assertion that drug tests did not
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lieved any balancing test between the racing board's interests
and the racing employees' interests would only support drug
tests predicated on reasonable, individualized suspicion.23 1
The special needs rationale was also narrowly interpreted
in National Treasu7y Employees Union v. Watkins.21l In this
case, the Department of Energy imposed random drug tests on
six classes of employees identified as safety- sensitive employ-
ees.232 As in Dimeo, the district court rejected a special needs
justification to test Department of Energy motor vehicle opera-
tors because these employees created no greater public safety
risk than any private citizen operating a motor vehicle.23 3 Un-
like employees who operate vehicles that transport other peo-
ple or involve constant public contact, these motor vehicle
operators infrequently transport documents. 34 In addition,
the Department of Energy had not systematically pursued secu-
rity checks or job controls and had no evidence of past drug-
related accidents.23 5  Thus, the court concluded that the
employees' privacy rights were substantial enough to require
the Department of Energy to demonstrate reasonable, individ-
ualized suspicion before an employee could be tested.2 ,6
The court in American Postal Workers Union v. Frank
reached a similar conclusion.3 7 There, the district court re-
jected the special needs rationale and accepted the constitu-
tionality of random drug tests on postal employees.23 8 Noting
have any potential deterrent effect, nor that deterrence could not be an accept-
able special needs justification. Rather, the district court was concerned that the
extent of the deterrent impact drug tests may have is still undetermined, and lack-
ing some empirical evidence supporting the deterrent effect, courts should not
merely assume an unproven assertion is sufficient to justify government intrusions
on citizens. Id. at 969 n.16.
230. Id. at 973.
231. 722 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1989).
232. These employees include presidential appointees, law enforcement officers,
other employees involved with law enforcement and national security, those deal-
ing with "sensitive information," positions involving protecting life, property, public
health or safety and positions involving a high degree of trust. Id. at 767 n.2.
233. Id. at 769-70.
234. Id. at 770.
235. While the district court argued that a lack of evidence indicating a record
of past drug-related accidents would not be sufficient to condemn drug tests
where extraordinary safety and national security hazards were present, the court
found these extraordinary conditions absent in the current circumstances. Id.
236. Id. at 771.
237. 725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989).
238. Id. at 90.
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that tragic accidents rarely, if ever, involve postal employees,
and that the postal service was not a highly regulated indus-
try,239 the court determined the privacy rights of postal em-
ployees were substantial enough to require at least a showing
of individualized suspicion before the employee could be sub-
jected to a drug test.240
This line of reasoning was further developed in Beattie v.
City of St. Petersburg Beach,24' where the federal district court
rejected a random drug testing program imposed on local
firefighters. In Beattie, firefighters had given urine samples for
several years as part of a required annual physical examina-
tion.212 St. Petersburg, while admitting there was no evidence
of past drug use among the firefighters, believed that testing
the urine samples for controlled substances would deter the
possibility of future drug use.2 13 St. Petersburg argued that
testing the urine for drugs would not be any more intrusive on
the firefighters' privacy rights since the firefighters were al-
ready submitting to urinalysis. 244 However, the district court
rejected St. Petersburg's logic and held that, lacking individual
suspicion, the special needs rationale could not be extended to
accommodate the city's unfounded fear that drug abuse would
eventually plague the local firefighters.245
District Judge Castagna's opinion relied heavily on the
firefighters' privacy rights. While admitting that these
employees' privacy rights may be justifiably decreased because
of the nature of their job, their privacy rights were still suffi-
cient to protect them from unfounded attempts by govern-
ment to pry into their private lives. 246 Here, the district
judge believed that without some form of individualized suspi-
cion or some compelling reason beyond a hypothetical future
239. Id.
240. Id. at 89.
241. 733 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
242. Id. at 1456.
243. St. Petersburg relied on the deterrence and public safety justifications of
the special needs rationale articulated in Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). However,
as the district court noted, while firefighters serve an important function in soci-
ety, they cannot be analogized to a customs agent whose job is drug interdiction.
733 F. Supp. at 1458-59.
244. Id. at 1457.
245. Id. at 1459.
246. Id. at 1457.
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problem of drug use, the invasion of privacy posed by includ-
ing an analysis of controlled substances violated the privacy
interests of the firefighters.247
It is still unclear whether federal courts will offset special
needs justifications for federal drug testing programs with
federal employees' privacy rights. On the one hand, Capua and
Beattie suggest that federal employees may enjoy enough U.S.
Constitutional privacy rights to thwart a special needs formula-
tion for drug testing programs. On the other hand, the infer-
ential constitutional right of privacy established in Griswold v.
Connecticut24s certainly allows federal judges the discretion to
weigh the strength of this implied right when determining the
strength of a governmentally-asserted public interest in a spe-
cial needs balancing application.
However, where states have specific constitutional privacy
rights pronouncements, citizens' privacy rights may substantial-
ly weaken state special needs arguments to justify dubious
search schemes. In California, for example, state courts have
ruled that California's privacy right protects state citizens in
both the public and private sectors 249 and that state privacy
rights could not be preempted by the Railway Labor Act.250
The decisions suggest that California citizens may be able to
invoke state privacy rights to insulate themselves from federal
administrative search policies.
In sum, cases at both the federal and state level decided
after Von Raab and Skinner demonstrate judicial recognition
that the relationship between an employee's professional re-
sponsibilities and his or her potential to threaten the public
interest will affect the scope of the employee's privacy rights.
Even in cases where the special needs rationale is narrowly
construed or altogether rejected, dicta suggests government
interests would prevail in a special needs balancing test when
247. Id. at 1458. The district court relied on the logic formulated in Capua v.
City of Plainfield, 643 F. Stipp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986). In Capua, the district
court invalidated a random drug testing program for the city's firefighters. Id. The
court in Capua correctly recognized that a random drug testing plan reports on a
person's off-duty activities just as surely as if someone was present and watching.
Id. Therefore, to be a reasonable search, government must demonstrate some
compelling reason to override the employees' breached expectations of privacy. Id.
248. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
249. Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1990).
250. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990).
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individualized reasonable suspicion of some wrongdoing is
present. Considering the Fourth Amendment has historically
enjoyed preferred freedom status in constitutional analysis,
requiring government to demonstrate only reasonable individ-
ualized suspicion is definitely compromising Fourth Amend-
ment probable cause standards. However, the compromise
may be warranted when judging the reasonableness of an ad-
ministrative search. Yet as the most potent, realistic deterrent
to the special needs rationale, requiring reasonable individual-
ized suspicion is still a much weaker weapon than any stan-
dards of proof required from a strict scrutiny perspective. At
best, lower courts are using the special needs rationale to fur-
ther erode the probable cause standard and in its place institu-
tionalize the reasonable suspicion standard in an increasing
array of administrative settings. At the other extreme, some
courts are applying the special needs rationale in a manner
that completely eviscerates any Fourth Amendment suspicion
requirements in administrative searches.
VI. THE SPECIAL NEEDS RATIONALE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A CRITIQUE
The line of cases decided by both the Supreme Court and
the lower courts is systematically ameliorating Fourth Amend-
ment protections. On the one hand, the Supreme Court ar-
gues that special needs analysis is merely a form of Fourth
Amendment balancing. However, the judiciary has, in barely a
six year period, developed the special needs rationale to adjust
Fourth Amendment balancing in a way that accepts govern-
mental searches totally devoid of individualized or even gener-
alized suspicion.
251
Perhaps Federal District Judge Sarokin in Capua v. City of
Plainfield252  best summarized the inherent flaw of
251. The judiciary has been conceptually in alliance with the escalating war on
drugs in the 1980s. As grave as the drug problem is in several societal sectors, it
does not warrant a wholesale amelioration of the Fourth Amendment. Doing so
erroneously stigmatizes whole categories of behavior as criminal and dangerous
when instead, drug use and abuse are more appropriately social and medical prob-
lems.
252. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
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suspicionless searches when he compared suspicionless drug
testing to police surveillance:
2 13
We would be appalled at the specter of the police spying
on employees during their free time and then reporting
their activities to their employers. Drug testing is a form of
surveillance, albeit a technological one. Nonetheless, it
reports on a person's off duty activities just as surely as
someone had been present and watching. It is George
Orwell's "Big Brother" society come to life.'
To argue that special governmental needs justifies
suspicionless, warrantless searches ignores the historical justifi-
cation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is
intended to protect citizens against overzealous government
surveillance.
We do not permit a search of every house on a block
merely because there is reason to believe that one contains
evidence of criminal activity. No prohibition more signifi-
cantly distinguishes our democracy from a totalitarian
government than that which bars warrantless searches and
seizures .... We would not condone the beatings of sus-
pects and the admissibility of their confessions merely
because a larger number of convictions resulted.255
Therefore, it seems reasonable, indeed necessary, that society
guard against governmental behavior that completely under-
values individual rights to ensure particular policy goals.
However, utilizing the special needs rationale, the Su-
preme Court seems willing to impose harsh regulatory policies
on society. Now that the special needs rationale has been ex-
panded to uphold suspicionless searches of both property and
people, there is little protection left in the Fourth Amend-
ment. Given the logic of the special needs rationale, it is possi-
ble, perhaps likely, that the courts could utilize it to accept the
constitutionality of virtually all administrative search schemes.
It is not inconceivable that the courts could even weave the
special needs rationale into one of the Fourth Amendment
warrant exceptions in criminally-related searches. Precedent for
this already exists since in Burger the special needs rationale
253. Id. at 1511.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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allowed police to engage in a suspicionless junkyard search
that led to a criminal prosecution.
The special needs rationale opens a Pandora's box by
which the essential ingredient justifying a search, probable
cause, is being systematically eroded. Whenever a court wishes
to ignore individual privacy rights, it now merely has to invoke
the special needs rationale.
Applying the special needs rationale to searches of premis-
es is itself a threat to Fourth Amendment protections. Howev-
er, expanding it to justify suspicionless searches of a person is
"unprincipled and dangerous. "211 It conceivably reduces
Fourth Amendment analysis to allow virtually any administra-
tive search merely because a court views a particular policy
more significant than individual privacy claims. Individual pri-
vacy claims will inevitably lose this type of balancing test, for it
is rare when individual behavior is perceived as more impor-
tant than the burdens forced on the public by the cumulative
effect of the individual behavior. However, the special needs
rationale institutionalizes the view that individual behavior
must summarily concede to the public interest. Undervaluing
individual behavior in favor of the public interest is completely
at odds with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
VII. UTILIZING STRICT SCRUTINY TO RESTORE
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
From judicial treatment of the special needs rationale, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that if Fourth Amendment
protections are to be restored, strict scrutiny and least intru-
sive analysis must guide Fourth Amendment special needs
cases. Several commentators have offered variations of these
analytical approaches as a means to counteract judicial accep-
tance of the rational basis approach to special needs cases.
One commentator, Scott Sundby, posits a model that
would first classify government's investigation as two distinct
types of searches: responsive and initiatory.257 Responsive
searches would only ensue after government determines that
256. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
257. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fousih Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mis-
chief of Camara and Tetiy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 418 (1988).
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individualized suspicion already exists. Initiatory searches
would take place if waiting for individualized suspicion could
frustrate government from pursuing legitimate objectives.258
However, before government could engage in an initiatory
search, it would be required to demonstrate that grave public
harm would likely result in the absence of a proposed search
and that the particular search scheme was the least restrictive
possible scheme.259 This format seems inherently logical as a
means to control arbitrary government action without crip-
pling government's ability to engage in legitimate activities.
While critics of the plan may argue that the scheme enables
government to initiate a search that would likely be unaccept-
able if probable cause was first required, government is sad-
dled with the burden to prove, not merely assert, that impor-
tant governmental objectives would be jeopardized in the ab-
sence of the search scheme. This strict scrutiny variation cre-
ates a balancing test that, unlike the special needs rationale,
does not relegate individual Fourth Amendment rights to neg-
ligible status. Indeed Sundby's model maximizes both govern-
mental and individual interests.
Similarly, Strossen poses a least intrusive alternative analy-
sis model for Fourth Amendment balancing. 260 Strossen ar-
gues that least intrusive analysis should govern judicial inquiry
of a proposed government search unless government can
prove that a search's benefits exceeds its costs, and that there
is no significantly less intrusive alternative to substantially
achieve government's goals.2 6' Specifically, unless the state
could demonstrate the absence of less intrusive alternative
measures, it should not be permitted to engage in mass or ran-
dom detentions, investigations, or any particularly intrusive
search with less than probable cause.262
These scholars recognize that it is vital for Fourth Amend-
ment analysis to be framed within a strict scrutiny perspective.
While efficient and effective government are desirable goals,
those ends do not justify any means. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental
258. Id. at 418, 425.
259. Id. at 431.
260. See Strossen, supn note 5, at 1254.
261. See Strossen, supra note 5, at 1257.
262. See Strossen, supra note 5, at 1261.
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freedom deserving strict scrutiny analysis.263 Only recently
has it retreated from this premise. While there may be some
logic to Fourth Amendment balancing as envisioned in Terry
and Camara, the Supreme Court has dangerously erred by
substituting rational relationship analysis for strict scrutiny
analysis in Fourth Amendment balancing. By doing so, it has
relegated Fourth Amendment protection to minor constitu-
tional status and has seriously subjected citizens' Fourth
Amendment privacy rights to arbitrary and capricious govern-
mental invasions. The Supreme Court could easily analyze the
reasonableness of special needs searches within one of the
existing warrant exceptions already developed. Before govern-
ment can so intimately intrude on the dignity of its citizens, it
should be forced to demonstrate a compelling government.
interest far in excess of mere administrative efficiency.
Had the lower court judges who accepted the special
needs formulation employed a strict scrutiny approach when
judging drug and AIDS testing programs, they would have
been forced to confront the obvious discrepancies in their
logic. First, judges would more likely require demonstrable
evidence that positive drug tests correlate with on the job im-
pairment. For example, one may have used marijuana or co-
caine weeks ago and not be affected on the job the day of an
accident, while one's previous evening's alcoholic binge, creat-
ing a job-performance-impairing hangover the next day that
contributed to an accident, might go undetected. In essence,
the special needs rationale silences any intelligent discussion
pertaining to the real causes of work related inefficiency. Sec-
ond, justifying the special needs rationale for deterrent purpos-
es silences debate between the likelihood that drug use will
permeate an employment sector currently free of drug abuse
and employee privacy rights curtailed as a result of the test. It
simply is not reasonable to assume that a work force, filled
with employees whose values repulse them toward drug abuse,
263. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf, the Supreme Court
incorporated the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures
into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The logic of incor-
poration suggests that only those liberties contained in the Bill of Rights that are
indispensable to the' concept of ordered liberty should be incorporated. As evi-
denced by its decisions in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court has viewed the essence
of the Fourth Amendment as an indispensable component of ordered liberty.
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will suddenly resocialize themselves to become drug abusers.
Assuming that drug abuse could permeate a sector, while pos-
sible, is no more likely than an endless array of potentialities
of human conduct and is sufficiently remote not to justify
wholesale intrusions on individual privacy.
Last, government can use the special needs rationale to
stretch the reach of drug testing to absurd limits. For example,
in the name of safety and deterrence, should the Department
of Transportation drug test postal carriers who routinely drive
postal trucks? Should the test extend to the mechanics who
work on the truck's brakes, to the employees who make the
brake shoes? Utilizing a strict scrutiny approach will require
judges to make more sensible and realistic judgements about
whether an employee's potential harm to society is real or
remote. By utilizing a strict scrutiny approach, government
would be required to prove its assertion that some evil will or
may be prevented as a result of a drug test.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article's thesis argues that the Supreme Court, in its
zeal to ensure efficient and effective government service deliv-
ery, has taken the Fourth Amendment perilously close to in-
comprehensible disarray. By developing the special needs ratio-
nale and expanding it to justify suspicionless governmental
intrusions into citizens' private lives, the Supreme Court is
developing Fourth Amendment law that is anathema to the
cherished principles of liberty our forefathers defended.
With David Souter and Clarence Thomas replacing retired
Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, the conser-
vative majority that emerged in the 1989 term will likely be-
come more pronounced in the 1990s.26' If these justices em-
brace a conservative judicial philosophy, fundamental constitu-
264. hlle author assumes future Supreme Court replacements will likely have a
more moderate judicial ideology than Justices Brennan and Marshall. Assuming the
nation's political climate does not take a radical and quick shift back to a domi-
nant liberal political climate, it appears unlikely that either a Democratic or Re-
publican president will replace these two justices with justices who are equally
liberal. Any justice more moderate than Marshall and Brennan will certainly aug-
ment the newly emergent conservative majority now comprised by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter.
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tional freedoms will continue to erode. What is troubling is
not so much the policy orientation the Supreme Court is
adopting; ideological debates are endemic among rational
human beings. What is so troubling is the cavalier attitude the
Supreme Court is taking while eliminating basic constitutional
freedoms. It is the height of judicial irresponsibility to claim, as
the Supreme Court does when it adopts the special needs ra-
tionale, that the only defense of a governmental program is
based on the justification that when a problem is so bad, gov-
ernment can adopt means that would normally be ruled un-
constitutional. Perhaps such reasoning can be reconciled under
extremely adverse conditions, such as a state of war or immi-
nent catastrophe, but certainly not for problems that are not
so severe they do not endanger civil government. -To admit, as
the Supreme Court does in Von Raab and Skinner, that
suspicionless searches would not pass traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis, but allow the searches anyway because
special governmental needs justify any methods to detect and
deter drug use, is intellectually and constitutionally indefensi-
ble.
If the judiciary continues to expand the special needs
rationale, government will surely become more efficient. Prob-
lems could more quickly be addressed. Yet it would be sadly
ironic if, in the name of efficient government, the public al-
lows the judiciary, which it entrusts with protecting constitu-
tional principles from tyrannical governmental action, to deny
the broad applicability of basic Fourth Amendment constitu-
tional principles. If constitutional principles continue to erode,
governmental invasions on society will expand and at some
point may spur society to demand more governmental sensi-
tivity to basic, constitutional principles. Until then, it seems
paradoxically sad that society is willing to let its freedoms slow-
ly erode until, one day, the cumulative effect of the erosion
will become so suddenly pronounced that society will condemn
the Supreme Court's insensitivity to the Constitution. As the
guardians of the Constitution, the judiciary, especially the Su-
preme Court, should have enough courage to base its deci-
sions on solid constitutional analysis. Law and the integrity of
American citizens demand no less. The special needs rationale
is a doctrine standing on a tenuous intellectual basis and as
such should not be the basis for constitutional doctrinal devel-
opment. In an age where technology and government can
1992]
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team together to probe citizens far beyond the imagination of
our Framers, strict scrutiny should be the operative model to
judge all Fourth Amendment challenges. Anything less will cer-
tainly erode citizens' ability to make individual judgments relat-
ed to the pursuit of life, liberty and property.
